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1 Introduction
When the 1997 World Development Report
(WDR97) was released, the Guardian (London)
announced 'Sudden U-turn by the World Bank'.
This was an exaggeration: we demonstrate below
that that there has been more evolution than revo-
lution in the ways in which recent World Bank doc-
uments and statements have treated 'the state'.
However, the external perception is that there has
indeed been a substantial shift in the public posi-
tion of the World Bank in relation to the role of
government in development. This is generally seen
as a change from a state-sceptical to a state-friendly
stance: governments are now believed to be very
important, and the priority is to make them work
better, rather than cutting them back.
For many people, this will be the message from
WDR97: 'the World Bank has moved to a more
consensual, middle-of-the-road position.' A num-
ber of contributors to this Bulletin suggest that this
is in itself a positive move: that more fruitful dia-
logue about development policy issues is possible
now that the Bank - one of the leading financial
and intellectual actors in the field - has adopted an
attitude to governance that is more congenial to
many of its client governments and to other aid and
development agencies. That shift in itself repre-
sents a move towards consensus. However, as
Garth Glentworth of the Department for
International Development (UK) suggests in his
note (Box 1), it would be a mistake to interpret
these more state-friendly noises from the Bank as a
reversion to some previous position, an endorse-
ment of the 'statist' views and practices we now
associate with the 1940s-80s, or a signal that the
big debate about the role of government in devel-
opment is now largely resolved, and reduced to a
few technical questions. While the authors of
WDR97 have striven to achieve a wide degree of
consensus, they also adopt and advocate a basic
stance that implies continuous reappraisal and evo-
lution of the role of government in development,
not relapse into some 'middle way' consensus. That
stance is encapsulated in the phrase 'matching role
to capability': adapting what governments do, and
how they do it, to their capability
Governments should concentrate on what they do
best, not over-reach themselves - and of course
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Box 1 A British Perspective
Garth Glentworth, Senior Adviser, Governance and Institutions Department,
Department for International Development, UK
Context
am writing this note in my personal capacity - as
a middle-level bureaucrat of some years experi-
ence, more concerned with the implementation of
aid projects and programmes than overall policy,
but very keenly interested in understanding the
overall context for development, to which the
World Development Report 97 (WDR97) adds very
significantly.
2 WDR97 is a very impressive piece of work; it is a
book' that covers, in considerable and very
informed detail, a vast range of issues relating to
the role of the state and its efficiency and effec-
tiveness. The authors have fallen over backwards
to be impartial and objective and - sometimes -
one hankers aher a little more prescription simply
to cut through the huge mass of informationl
3 This factor of length and denseness could affect
negatively the Report's impact on many develop-
ing and transitional countries. Not many aid offi-
cials or policy makers in the West will read the
document from cover to cover and it is even less
likely that Southern counterparts will do so. But
there is a compensating factor: the Report can be
dipped into occasionally; it does not have to be
read as a whole.
Status and Impact
4 The members of the World Bank Task Force who
introduced the WDR at the European Policy Forum
disarmingly referred to the document as merely a
think-piece and not a set of operating guidelines.
An NGO representative at the same meeting
described it as 'a highly leveraged intervention in
the development policy market'. The truth lies in
between: the Report is much more than simply a
contribution to ideas, but less than the definitive
bible on the subject of governance. The World
Bank should perhaps make it clear what status
they intend for their World Development Reports;
they have to be honest about the massive impact
these reports will have on development thinking. A
limitation is that WDRs treat different subjects
every year. In terms of the institutional politics of
the Bank and of the fact that different groups want
their areas highlighted, this is understandable.
However, it would be extremely useful if WDRB8
returned to the same themes as WDR97, and
reported on their practical operationalisation in
Bank programmes and elsewhere. But this may
be impossible.
5 lt became clear during the European Policy Forum
that staff of the European bilateral aid and devel-
opment agencies tended to overestimate the
extent to which WDR97 represents a transforma-
tion in World Bank thinking. Certainly, the Bank
has now renounced its minimalist view of the
state, in which the central objective was to reduce,
as much as possible, state influence in size and
cost. That view, in any case, never fully affected
the Bank's lending portfolio. For example, mention
was made of 63 existing legal-sector development
projects in World Bank operations; this hardly
smacks of minimalism in practicel There was also
a tendency to claim that the bilateral perspective,
particularly that of the Scandinavians and perhaps
the Dutch, which has never abandoned the pri-
macy of the state, was now vindicated; by impli-
cation, the World Bank had admitted the error of
its ways, etc. A more careful reading of WDR97
will show that the recognition of the state's role
and the primacy for its effectiveness still repre-
sents a compromise between the leading role that
used to be espoused and the reduction of state
functions. There is still a balance and it still veers
towards minimalism in many facets.
Contents
6 My own field predisposes me towards special
consideration of chapters 5, 6 7, Band 10- those
referring to the civil service and to the special
problems of capability and effectiveness of 'soft'
and even more collapsed or failed' states. Here
there is a wealth of guidance, but perhaps not
enough sifting and prescription on priorities.
States at this end of the spectrum face what might
be called enforced minimalism: the inability to
staff, manage and fund anything more than the
basics of governance if there is to be any practical
impact at all. They constitute the most graphic
demonstrationof the WDR message of matching
capabilities to responsibilities. I think there could
have been, with advantage, further treatment of
this category of country - after all the most needy
and deserving - and this should have formed a
larger part of çhapters g and 10. The treatment
there is optimistic rather than sensible -waiting for
'windows of opportunity' is all very well, but we
can't wait for long! This is where I would like to see
published a follow-up to WDR97 - if not in
WDR98, then at least in other well researched and
widely circulated publications, If these also give
special attention to packaging and summaries that
will actually be read and assimilated by decision-
makers in the countries under review, so much the
better.
strive to build up their capacity It would be easy to
pour scorn on a 'strategy' that appears so obvious
and so general that it gives no real guidance on how
to tackle particular policy decisions. lt is, however,
a strategy that has more potential bite than first
appears. It can bite in two main ways.
First, 'matching role to capability' is the kind of
'public idea' that provides the basis for relatively
reasoned policy discussions in situations where the
policy decision might otherwise simply reflect the
interests of powerful groups (Kelman 1988). Public
ideas help frame political debate, and thus influence
both the way in which it is conducted and its out-
comes. 'Matching role to capability' is potentially an
influential public idea. Especially in countries that
have a recent tradition of statism and a large state
sector, the idea that government should concentrate
on what it does best, and not over-reach itself, pro-
vides a conceptual and normative framework
within which one can have a reasoned debate about
whether, for example, district agricultural extension
officers should continue to have the responsibility
for licensing traders in agro-chemicals. The 'role-
capability' discourse directs us to ask whether this
regulatory power is on balance (a) a good use of
agricultural extension resources and (b) actually
effective. lt can replace a statist discourse in which,
for example, the fact or belief that unscrupulous
traders sometimes cheat poor farmers by selling
sub-standard chemicals itself constitutes automatic
grounds for more public regulation - and where
Increasing that capability is the second core element capability by reinvigorating public institutions' (p.3).
in the Reporls strategy for the state: 'raising state
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failure of government to regulate directly is seen as
evidence that they do not care about poor farmers.
The same point can be made more directly by
describing what the 'role-capability' injunction is
ruling out. It is ruling out arguments of the nature:
'This agency may not yet be very good at running
training courses for small-scale entrepreneurs, but,
given the time and the resources, we will certainly
learn.'
Second, the 'role-capability' injunction has bite
because it entrenches scepticism about the compe-
tence of the state: it encourages a bias in favour,
either of doing nothing, or of intervening with sim-
ple rather than complex tools. In his article, Andrea
Cornia suggests that there is a genuine bias here:
that WDR97 expresses more scepticism about the
state than about the capability of non-state actors -.
both the market and civil society Further, Cornia
suggests that the Report embodies an assumption
that the respective 'capabilities' of these different
agencies are substantially independent of one
another. More precisely, it is assumed that, if the
state is incompetent and unable to perform certain
functions, the market is likely to pick them up. But
what happens if the market is itself highly fragile
and under-developed, and cannot develop further
without more active support from the state, in the
form of commercial legislation, effective policing,
judicial and penal systems, and the creation of an
environment in which the enforcement of law is the
normal expectation and the basis upon which peo-
pie enter into economic relationships? Is there not a
danger of triggering a vicious circle of decline in the
capabilities of state and market (and perhaps civil
society) if the state withdraws from activities that it
appears to do badly, in circumstances where the
alternative institutions are fragile and dependent on
the state? Comia and others make these points par-
ticularly in relation to the transitional economies of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where
market institutions often appear very fragile.
Notably in chapters 3 and 7, WDR97 shows an
awareness of these issues. lt is unlikely that one
could achieve agreement between the Bank and its
critics on whether the Report deals with them ade-
quately The point here is that there is real substance
behind the bland-sounding central injunction in
WDR97 that states should match their role to their
capability
WDR97 makes a significant contribution to the
debate about the role of government in develop-
ment - a contribution that extends well beyond sig-
nalling a more state-friendly World Bank. The
purpose of this Bulletin is partly to explain what
the World Bank team have to say, but mainly to
examine and critique. By reproducing here the
Overview to WDR97, we permit the Bank team to
summarise their message. Our focus is on examina-
tion and critique. But who are 'we'? We reflect the
European Policy Forum on the Role of Government
in Development, that was held at the IDS on 17-18
September 1997.2 This Forum was designed to
explore the usefulness and relevance of WDR97 to
the European aid and development agencies. It was
a small meeting, attended by four main categories of
people: the heads or senior staff of European bilat-
eral aid agencies; representatives of European devel-
opment NGOs; senior public servants and public
sector management specialists from Brazil and
India; and a number of European academics spe-
cialising in development policy research. Five of the
latter - Andrea Gomia (Italy), John Martinussen
(Denmark), Mick Moore (UK), Alice Sindzingre
(France), and Oda van Cranenburgh (The
Netherlands) - prepared in advance written cri-
tiques of WDR97 that formed the focus of the
Forum discussions and, in amended form,
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the
Department for International Development (UK), the
Swedish International Development Cooperation
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comprise the bulk of this Bulletin. Ajay Chhibber,
the head of the World Bank's WDR97 team, and
Alison Evans, a team member, also participated in
the Forum. We have done our best to be balanced
in our discussions of WDR97 at every stage of the
process. This 'balance' extends to the tone of the
individual articles: most of our authors have some
positive things to say about the Report, before
launching their attacks, and some are more approv-
ing than disapproving. However, the article by Nick
Hildyard and Alex Wilks continues the tradition of
using IDS publications to air vigorous critiques of
the World Bank, and argue very different positions.
The views represented here are not wildly imbal-
anced; they are diverse; they are limited in one
important, intentional respect: they are the voices of
European aid and development professionals.
Our contributors address two main sets of issues:
The first set stem from a literal perspective on
WDR97, i.e. from taking it at face value as a con-
tribution to the debate about the role of govern-
ment in development from a highly qualified
bunch of professional colleagues. The questions
concern the validity of the views on the role of
the state in development contained in WDR97.
Is the analysis accurate? Are the facts disputed?
Are the conclusions clear and valid? How far are
they practically useful? What are the risks and
downsides? To what extent has the Report
taken, or should it take, into account varying
regional and national circumstances?
The second set of issues, intertwined with the
first in practice, arise from going beyond this lit-
eral interpretation of the Report to examine the
process by which it was produced. They are
questions about the World Bank itself. They can
rarely be avoided in discussing any World
Development Report, because the Bank plays
such a prominent, activist role in development
policy debates from a position of influence and
privilege. Such questions are especially salient in
this case because of the perception that there has
been a significant shift in the position of the
Bank on issues that lie at the heart of some of the
most ideologically charged debates about poli-
tics and governance worldwide. Has the Bank
Agency and the World Bank for this Forum and for this
Bulletin.
really changed its position on the state? Is
WDR97 a statement of the Banks formal posi-
tion, a signal about its changing attitudes,
addressed perhaps as much to its own staff as to
the outside world, or just a contribution to the
debate? If the Bank has changed its position,
should it not come clean about it, and perhaps
even repent publicly? Is it right that the World
Bank should have so much power to re-frame
the debate about development issues? Does it
use that power well? Does it consult enough
outside the Bank? Should World Development
Reports be produced through some different
process? Does the Report take sufficient account
of the World Bank itself as an actor in the inter-
national system that is analysed inside its covers.
Does the Report focus adequately on what the
Bank itself should be doing in relation to the
problems that are identified?
These process issues are contentious. The main
criticisms of the Bank are set out clearly in the note
on process by Alex Wilks (The process of preparing
World Development Reports: a critique') and in his
joint article with Nicholas 1-lildyard. The remainder
of this editorial concentrates on the validity issues.
2 Does WDR97 Say the Right
Things?
Good student essays receive brief comments; bad
ones need mini-essays in return. This seems unfair
on those who merit praise, but there good reasons
for doing things this way We will treat WDR97 in
the same way, and not dwell at length on its virtues.
They are summarised in the papers by Andrea
Cornia and Mick Moore in particular. The main
virtues are, at the level of method and approach: a
general sense of balance'; a serious engagement
with recent research and with researchers in politi-
cal science and public management, and an attempt
to integrate their perspectives with those of econo-
mists; open-mindedness; and a realistic under-
standing of the limits of general prescription about
these issues. At the more concrete level, the Report
contains very useful discussion of, among other
things, approaches to public regulation; the politics
of economic reform; the character and conse-
quences of corruption; the reform, organisation and
motivation of the public service; the potential con-
tribution of NGOs and civil society to development
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and to statesociety partnerships; and ways to
increase the accountability of governments.
Policymakers and practitioners concerned with
improving public sector management are likely to
want to keep WDR97 on their shelves as a source of
ideas.
Our contributors have more to say by way of cri-
tique. Their main criticisms can be organised under
six questions. We begin from the more concrete and
precise questions and move to the more abstract.
(j) Do governments of poor countries
raise enough revenue?
There was a widespread view at the European
Policy Forum that WDR97 had not paid enough
attention to the urgent need for the governments of
poor countries to increase their capacity to raise
revenue (in an equitable and efficient fashion). The
situation is chronic in some of the transitional
economies, notably Russia, where government rev-
enue sources have withered, but serious in many
poor developing countries. This point is argued in
Andrea Cornia paper and the summarised in the
response to the Report from the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency
(Sida) by Dag Ehrenpreis (Box 2). The strength of
the feeling expressed in the Forum reflected the
confluence of three distinct concerns. One is the
fact that aid volumes are shrinking, and that the
governments of some of the poorest countries that
have become very aid dependent over the last two
decades will soon have to find alternative financial
resources or face a (further) decline in their capa-
bilities. The second is a matter of fiscal arithmetic.
WDR97 includes some implicit acknowledgement
- although not enough for some of our commenta-
tors Uohn Martinussen, Andrea Cornia) - that the
effectiveness of government depends on its legiti-
macy, and that in turn is shaped by the extent to
which it visibly pays attention to the needs of the
poor and vulnerable. The Report argues the need to
increase (efficient and effective) public spending on
health and education services for the poor (p.52).
Yet where is the money to be found? In the Forum
discussions, John Toye of the IDS made the point
that the public finance statistics in the statistical
tables appended to WDR97 indicate that, on cur-
rent trends, the money will not be available. The
third concern is more political: that high levels of
dependence of governments on aid - or other
Box 2 The Response from Sida
Dag Ehrenpreis, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
1 WDR97 has many merits. Its analysis is of high
overall quality; it is well written and, as is usual with
World Bank reports, has helpful pedagogical illus-
trations. The approach is refeshingly pragmatic,
thus moving away from the rather ideological and
confrontational debate on the issue of state versus
market of the last 10-15 years. Sida appreciates
the constructive approach of WDR97, emphasis-
ing the cornplenientarity of state and market,
rather than the contradictions.
2 The Report represents a very positive and wel-
come new approach on the part of the World
Bank. The Bank has previously focused more on
the macro-economic policy framework than on the
institutional framework. The early Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) emphasised
reduction of public expenditures for macro-eco-
nomic stabilisation. WDR97 indicates a redefinition
of the role of the state in World Bank policy. lt
shows that development requires an effective
state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role,
encouraging and complementing the activities of
private businesses and individuals. Without an
effective state, sustainable development, both
economic and social, is impossible.' (Foreword by
James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank.)
Thus, it is now recognised that the state has an
important role in establishing an institutional frame-
work conducive to (a) lowering transaction costs, (b)
functioning markets and (C) stimulating productive
investments - as well as providing public goods
and services.
3 WDR97 mainly discusses the efficiency of the
state in fulfilling its core functions of providing pure
public goods but also merit goods and services,
for example in the social sectors. However, it is
regrettable that the Report does not clarify and
develop the theme of the role of the state in legit-
imising and promoting economic and social equal-
ity. Recent World Bank research has shown the
importance of reducing inequalities, not just as an
objective in itself or to achieve short-term poverty
reduction, but also to stimulate overall growth.
Thus, equality and growth can be mutually support-
ive, and WDR97 fails to promote this important role
of the state in equalising reforms and also in formu-
lating and implementing economic and structural
policies that promote pro-poor growth patterns.
4 In this connection, the traditional World Bank
approach of targeting or means testing and sup-
porting social safety nets ÇiNDR9O) ought to have
been critically reviewed, given for example the
interesting World Bank research integrating politi-
cal economy and econometrics, This shows that
'More for the Poor means Less for the Poor'
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
1997) as a result of the workings of the political
process; the size of the budget available for redis-
tributive and social welfare programmes is deter-
mined by the extent to which a majority of the
population benefits from these programmes. This
is a main reason why Sweden and many other
countries have had universal social policies rather
than means testing. There are also incentive prob-
lems with means testing, including fraudulent
behaviour that can undermine overall productivity.
A related problem is that using performance indi-
cators for public services creates incentives to
provide the least services to the most expensive
(i.e. the most deprived) clients, aggravating the
problem of social exclusion. The point here is that
issues of poverty reduction and equality should be
considered for all state policy reform programmes,
at all levels.
5 WDR97 focuses almost completely on the expen-
diture side of the budget, but the revenue side is
at least as important for reforming the state and its
finances. Domestic resource mobilisation is impor-
tant as a tool for financially sustainable develop-
ment. There seems to be an unfortunate division
of responsibilities between the World Bank (public
expenditures) and the International Monetary Fund
(public revenues), where it should be obvious that
the two sides of the budget must be analysed
together, along with systemic and management
issues.
6 Aid donors have particular reasons for emphasis-
¡ng the point that partner countries in develop-
ment cooperation need to mobilise their own
resources in order to reduce aid dependency,
which is a problem of increasing concern to aid
agencies'. This issue is of concern to the tax-pay-
ing public in donor countries, which is increasingly
lukewarm about continuing to pay for foreign aid,
if those in recipient countries, who can afford to,
do not contribute to public revenues.
7 Finally, discussions at the European Policy Forum
on WDR97 showed on this and other points that
bilateral donors had a lot of views ¡n common on
reforming the state. There was a consensus that
policy coordination in this area should improve in
order to conduct a more concerted and forceful
dialogue with the internatiOnal financial institutions.
sources of 'unearned income', such as mineral
royalties - appear consistently to undermine the
relationships of accountability to society that are
clearly so important in improving the quality of
governance in many poor countries. In these cir-
cumstances, developing the local tax base can con-
tribute directly to increasing accountability and
democracy (Mick Moore; see also Oda van
Cranenburgh).
Good policies versus good government?
The central theme of Andrea Cornia's paper is that
the authors of WDR97 have failed to make a suffi-
ciently clear distinction between (a) 'good govern-
ment' issues, that should be viewed in terms of the
processes of government; and (b) the question of
what are appropriate economic policies in different
circumstances. Gomia believes that too many ele-
ments of the disputed 'Washington consensus'
about economic policy appear in WDR97 in the
guise of elements of good government (see also the
articles by Nicholas 1-lildyard and Alex Wilks, and
by Oda van Cranenburgh). The debate about the
boundary between the processes of government and
the content of public policy has been live in devel-
opment studies since structural adjustment and
economic liberalisation loomed large on the policy
agenda. It will not go away in a hurry
Poverty alleviation versus governance?
While the European Policy Forum was meeting,
most senior staff of the UK'S Department for
International Development (DfID) were busy
preparing a new White Paper on development poi-
icy to reflect the concerns of the new Labour gov-
ernment. When this White Paper appeared, it gave
the eradication of poverty absolute priority in
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British development policy ('Eliminating world
poverty: a challenge for the 21st century',
November 1997). This official British position pre-
sumably now corresponds with that of several of
our commentators: that WDR97 pays insufficient
attention to issues of poverty and inequality A more
radical position is taken here by Leen Boer, a senior
Dutch aid policy adviser (Box 3). l-le suggests that
aid donors should not support any view aboút the
role of the state in development that does not take
the elimination of poverty as the over-riding, imme-
diate, direct objective of public action. There are
two ill-defined polar positions here in a debate that
has not yet been seriously joined. The position
implicitly embodied in WDR97 reflects what has
been an orthodoxy within most aid and develop-
ment agencies for about half a decade: that many
poor countries have serious, distinctive governance
problems and that helping resolve these problems -
whether by providing more reliable and accessible
policing, legal, penal and judicial services, improv-
ing the performance and accountability of govern-
ment agencies, or reducing corruption - will have
direct, tangible, positive impacts on the standards
and quality of life of the poor, without need for spe-
cific targeting. The World Bank played a major role
in promoting this governance agenda, but has
plenty of allies within bilateral aid agencies. Most
bilateral aid agencies have been reorganised within
the last five years such that governance issues,
defined and labelled in a range of ways, are the
responsibility of distinct and relatively influential
divisions within the organisation.
The alternative view ïs that aid donors should only
be interested in governance issues to the extent that
their resolution would make a direct impact on the
Box 3 A Missed Opportunity
Leen Boer, Senior Advisor on International Cooperation, Strategic Policy Orientation Unit,
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
Poverty reduction is the overarching objective of the
World Bank. This is not obvious from a reading of
WDR97. Though poverty reduction is mentioned at
times, it is far from being part and parcel of the analy-
sis and prescription; it receives attention in relation to
the provision of basic social services and the protec-
tion of the vulnerable. In the latter case, the analysis in
the Report is clear: until now, developing country gov-
ernments have been wrestling with the fundamental
function of protecting the vulnerable; they have exper-
imented with a variety of social assistance measures,
ranging from programmes that provide cash assis-
tance, to price subsidies and labour-intensive public
works. In many countries, however, such pro-
grammes have failed to protect the vulnerable; they
have, instead, resulted in the transfer of resources to
elite groups, sometimes with fiscally destabilising con-
sequences. No concrete advice is given in the Report
as to how governments with weak institutional capa-
bility could better go about the task of protecting the
vulnerable.
'Over the long term, rapid growth and investment in
people will cut poverty dramatically' (p.54). Yet,
poverty reduction is not a topic in the chapter on eco-
nomic management by the state. That is strange,
because the first element of the two-part strategy to
reduce poverty, as put forward in the 1990 World
Development Report on poverty, was 'to promote the
productivo use of the poor's most abundant asset -
labor', ¡n order to realise broad-based economic
growth. There is no mention at all in the relevant chap-
ter in WDFt97 of a more activist role of government in
ensuring a more pro-poor pattern of growth. lt has
recently been pointed out, in other World Bank publi-
cations, that measures can be taken to maximise the
benefits the poor receive from economic growth, by
including the poor in that growth.2 This question
should have been treated in WDR97. lt represents an
lo
important issue, even where resources are limited and
institutions are weak. Weak states, too, have to make
choices about where to invest their scarce resources
for roads or for agricultural extension.
The approach to the state in the WDR97 is very eco-
nomic and rather technocratic. Insufficient attention
has been paid to non-economic tasks of the state, to
its political dimensions, and to the power and interest
groups behind the state. Most of the discussion of
power is in a separate chapter at the end. This imbal-
ance reduces considerably the practical value of the
Report. The World Bank's mandato is often said to
prohibit the involvement of the Bank in political issues.
Still, politics is at the coro of development and of the
state. So, an adequate analysis ot the political con-
text of the World Bank's activities, be it investment or
advice, is crucial for its development effectiveness.
Formally a World Development Report is not a World
Bank policy paper. lt is a think-piece. lt is safe to
assume, however, that W0R97 reflects the beginning
of a re-discovery of the state by the World Bank. That
is a gain. However, the lack of attention to poverty
reduction, especially regarding the state's role in eco-
nomic management, and its one-sided economic and
technocratic focus, make the WDR97 a missed
opportunity.
This box reflects the author's personal views, and not
those of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The text
iv based on the author's review of the WDR97 in Third
World Quarterly, Vol 18 No 5, 1997.
World Bank, 1996. 'Taking sction for poverty reduction in
sub-Saharan Africa: report of an Africa Region task force',
Washington, D.C. See also: World Bank, 1996, 'Poverty
Reduction and the World Bank: progress and challenges In
the 1990s', Washington, D.C.
alleviation of poverty; poverty comes first. Although
the debate has not yet been held, one can see the
outlines of a compromise position: that poverty
concerns should perhaps receive absolute priority
where recipient governments are themselves in rea-
sonable shape, but that tackling governance issues,
without any explicit targeting for direct, preferential
impact on the poor, may be a much better way to
help the poor in those countries where government
does not fulfil its basic functions, and an effective
state has to be (re)created. It would be very unfor-
tunate if the new British White Paper were to signal
and help bring about yet another policy flip on the
part of the aid donors, and the governance agenda,
not yet a decade old, were to be junked in favour of
the next fashion.
(iv) Does globalisation make a difference?
WDR97 is titled 'The State in a Changing World'
(emphasis added). It contains recurrent reference to
that bundle of changes that we tend to package
under the label of 'globalisation'. Yet several of our
commentators (Andrea Cornia, Nicholas Hildyard
and Alex Wilks, Mick Moore) question whether the
Report takes adequate account of the consequences
of globalisation. It certainly represents the orthodox
view that globalisation implies the need for more
inter-state cooperation to reduce instability and to
tackle global level problems like environmental pol-
lution (Chapter 8). The Report's critics make two
main points about the implications of globalisation
for national governments. One is that globalisation
implies a more volatile, risky economy, and a
greater consequent need for activist states to protect
both their citizens and their economies against the
worst consequences of this volatility - and in the
process preserve their own legitimacy (see Rodrik
1997). The other is that the concern still implicit in
WDR97 about 'overweening states' may be dated: a
defining feature of globalisation is the increased
power of controllers of mobile international capital
in relation to governments. Governments appear to
be losing power. Have we once again achieved
something of a consensus on a public policy issue
just at the moment that the world has moved on
and the nature of the problem changed radically?
(y) Does the Report take adequate account
of the international dimensions of
governance in poor countries?
One of the potential disadvantages of the current
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obsession with the nature and consequences of
globalisation is that serious discussion of many of
the other international dimensions of development
issues - a discussion as old as development studies
itself - may fall by the wayside. There is a wide-
spread understanding, at least among academic
social scientists, that we tend consistently to under-
play these international issues because we face a lin-
guistic and conceptual trap: we know how to
categorise and talk about the world in terms of
countries, and in terms of a distinction between
'internal' or 'domestic' and 'international' issues.
Built into our language is the assumption that the
'domestic' is 'normal' and that the influence of
'international' factors is secondary or peripheral.
We do not know how to talk about the world in a
way that recognises the permeability of 'national'
societies, economies and polities, and the artificial-
ity of the distinction between 'domestic' and the
'international'. At the very least, we need to make a
consistent effort to remind ourselves of this bias and
to try to correct it. Several of our contributors -
Mick Moore, Alice Sindzingre, Oda van
Cranenburgh - believe that effort was not made in
producing WDR97. The Report operates in terms of
the conventional distinction between 'domestic' and
the 'international'; and the 'international' dimen-
sions of governance are treated in a separate, thin,
chapter (Chapter 8). The inference is clear: gover-
nance problems in poor countries are primarily to
be understood as 'domestic' problems with 'domes-
tic' causes and 'domestic' remedies. There is no
place on the WDR97 agenda for any proposition
that causes or solutions are to be found to any sig-
nificant degree in the aid relationship, or in inequal-
ity, dependence and exploitation between nations.
(vi) Does the Report deal adequately with
the political dimensions of the state and
governance?
Given that most of our commentators are academic
political scientists, it was virtually inevitable that
they would collectively award the WDR team low
marks on this question. Mick Moore tries to shift
the perspective a little by awarding political science
itself a low score for coherence and authoritative-
ness. He argues that there is no agreed scientific
core to political science in terms of concepts, meth-
ods or even basic understandings of the nature of
the state, and suggests that, by attempting to take a
view on any of these issues, the World Bank
Box 4 A View from Denmark
Ellen Margrethe Loi, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
WDR97 correctly states both that the state can play a
determining role in economic development and that
state structures can vary between countries with
more or less similar living standards. This can be illus-
trated by the high living standards in the Scandinavian
countries, which have strong welfare states, while
some of the newly industrialised economies in South
East Asia have achieved almost comparable living
standards with quite different state structures and
much smaller public sectors. Apparently, no single
path to development can be found, and a high level of
economic development can be achieved under differ-
ent state formations and with varying degrees of pub-
lic sector involvement in the economies.
Seen in this context, WDR97 contains a wealth of
information and material. Moreover, the general
approach, with a focus on how to make the state
institutions more effective and on 'reinvigorating state
institutions', implies a courageous break with the
polarised discussion of state versus market in the
1970s and 1980s.
The question is, however, how far can we go in gen-
eralising from the individual case analyses in the
Report. A challenging question is, of course, how far
success stories can be transplanted to countries with
a less effective state apparatus and, perhaps conse-
quently, slower economic growth. This question could
be relevant, for instance, to several countries on the
African continent. Part Four of the Report on
Removing Obstacles to Change' makes an attempt
to address this question but, it seems, inadequately. I
will briefly cite two examples. First, the Report offers a
perspective on the effectiveness and economic effi-
ciency of the state, while the political level is only
reflected indirectly. Consequently, the Report probably
underestimates not only the role of different political
interests, but also the potential political opposition to
reforms. Second, most observers agree that any suc-
cessful reform must be located in the local institutions,
and that reform failures can offen be explained by
insufficient understanding of local conditions.
However, the Report does not provide any systematic
analysis of the role of local institutions, nor of the
importance of local norms and culture. In designing
and implementing public sector reforms, both issues
must be considered carefully.
The WDR97 has put important questions on the
agenda, but we must realise that our understanding of
several issues is still inadequate. Therefore, the dis-
cussion on the role of the state must continue.
inevitably opens itself to trenchant criticism and
raging dissent. There is a certain amount of both
from most of our contributors. In attempting sim-
ply to categorise the various critiques, we risk draw-
ing that criticism upon ourselves. Here goes.
Several of our contributors assert that the WDR
team have their political analysis wrong in some
particular respect: that they underestimate the
contribution of income equality and effective public
anti-poverty interventions to the legitimacy of
states, and, thus, to the quality of governance (John
Martinussen, Andrea Cornia); that they ail to appre-
ciate the character of states built on personal rule
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(Alice Sindzingre); that they deal inadequately with
the issue of the autonomy of states in policymaking
(Oda van Cranenburgh); and that they miss an
opportunity to explain how corruption can be
organised to minimise the adverse effects on
economic development (Mick Moore). There are, in
addition, three broader, main lines of attack on the
political analysis in WDR. They are organised here
in ascending order of radicalism:
John Martinussen and Oda van Cranenburgh in
particular argue that WDR97 in various ways
fails to understand politics and attempts to
reduce the task of governance to something that
is essentially technical and administrative,
blocking out the political (see also Box 4). Both
are essentially addressing bilateral aid donors
who, unlike the World Bank, are free to pursue
explicit political objectives (accountability,
democracy, human rights etc.) without having
continually to defend their involvement in gov-
ernance issues in terms of the beneficial conse-
quences for economic policies and
performance. Both Martinussen and van
Cranenburgh indicate ways in which bilateral
aid donors can involve themselves in attempts to
improve governance in poor countries that are
more overtly political and discretionary than
anything the World Bank could contemplate.
Nick Hildyard and Alex Wilks, representing a
part of the NGO sector that keeps a close and
critical eye on World Bank activities, make a
kind of argument that would have been main-
stream in academic development studies two
decades ago, but now appears to have been
exiled to the margins of intellectual life. It is in
essence the case that WDR97 contains an
implicit agenda that reflects one of the dominant
components df the processes we label globalisa-
tion: the increasing power of controllers of capi-
tal in relation to governments. That agenda is to
help entrench corporate power and influence
over governments, and to help restrain the
democratic influence of citizens and civil society
organisations. The 'participation' that the Report
recommends is in practice 'engineering consent'.
The mechanisms it proposes to make states more
effective are likely to make them more effective
in the interests of capital - and of the World
Bank itself.
Neither of the two previous critiques departs
from the normative framework that governs
most contemporary debates about governance,
development and the state: the assumption that
there are serious deficits in respect of democracy,
accountability and legitimacy, and the belief that
attempts to enhance citizens' influence over the
state should be core components of any strategy
to make states more effective subject only to
concerns that some economic policy decisions
might have to be made in relative insulation
Academic political scientists will recognise this
division as a re-run of 1960s debates within
modernisation theory, between more orthodox scholars
who viewed democracy and participation as defining
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from popular pressures. Alice Sindzingre is an
Africa specialist. Her paper focuses on the impli-
cations of personal rule. Let us present one of
her conclusions in her own words: 'An impor-
tant task is to encourage weak governments
based on personal rule to focus on building
durable political institutions and on assuring the
insertion of their countries in the world econ-
omy - and for them to see this as being in their
interest - rather than fixating on domestic polit-
ical considerations related to problems of legiti-
macy' In the current intellectual climate, it is
radical to suggest that the best path to 'political
development' and improving state effectiveness
lies in working with political elites, paying atten-
tion to their motivations and perceptions, and in
building up the authority and coherence of state
and political institutions, without worrying too
much about issues of democracy or representa-
tion.3 The World Bank could not get away with
publicly advocating any such strategy However,
as Alice Sindzindre points out, this appears to be
the strategy that the operational departments of
the Bank are actually pursuing, at least in Africa.
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components of political development, and Samuel
Huntington's (1968) heterodox position that authority
and institution-building were the key issues.
